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SEIZURES OF UNITED STATES FISHING
VESSELS-THE STATUS OF THE WET WAR
I. INTRODUCTION
When Zeus, Poseidon and Hades shook lots in a helmet to
determine the lordship of the sky, sea and underworld, Poseidon
won the sea, and became its sovereign., Man's attempts to
determine sovereignty of the seas have proved more difficult.
This problem is illustrated by the Wet War in the Pacific-the
tuna boat conflict between Chile-Ecuador-Peru and the United
States.
On September 28, 1945, the United States issued the
Truman Proclamations regarding the Continental Shelf and the
Coastal Fisheries. These proclamations secured specific rights in
the resources of the seabed and subsoil," and established
conservation zones to be regulated by the United States, subject
to the fishing rights of nationals of other nations.' The
proclamations did not extend sovereignty over off-shore waters
beyond the limit of the territorial seas. Apparently, other nations
misunderstood this point and construed the proclamations as
heralding an extension of sovereignty, because the Truman
Proclamations were followed by a spate of pronuncialnentos by
other nations. Included were those of Chile, Ecuador and Peru
which claimed "sole sovereignty and jurisdiction over the areas
I. R. GRAVES, GREEK MYTHS 59 (1955).
2. The term "Wet War" was apparently first used by Senator Thomas Kuchel in
1963. See Weissberg, Fisheries. Foreign Assistance Custom and Conventions, 16 INT'L &
Co.%i. L.Q. 707 (1967).
3. Policy of t4e United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and Seabed of the Continental Shelf F.R. Doe. 45-18176, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945).
The Continental Shelf Proclamation was not the first such proclamation, Its forerunner
was the United Kingdom-Venezuela Treaty of 1942, whereby the seabed of the Gulf of
Paria (between Venezuela and Trinidad) was divided between the two signatories.
However, the Truman Proclamation was the first clear-cut enunciation of tl}e principle.
Grunawalt, The Acquisition of the Resources of the Bottom of the Sea-A Aew Frontier
of International Law, 34 MIL. L. REV. 111 (1966).
4. Policy of the United States With Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas oJ
the High Seas, F.R. Doe. 45-18175, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304 (1945).
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of sea adjacent to the coast of its own country and extending not
less than 200 nautical miles" from shore.'
The crux of the fishing vessel dispute is the disparity in the
size of the territorial sea claimed by the three Latin American
nations and that claimed by the United States. Chile, Ecuador
and Peru claim a territorial sea of 200 miles breadth,' while the
United States claims a three mile territorial sea,7 and an
exclusive fishing zone which extends from shore a distance of
twelve miles.'
The dispute is 17 years old. More than 140 United States
tuna ships have been seized, primarily by Ecuador and Peru, and
innumerable others harassed in waters which the United States
considers res comniunus Typically, the tuna boats have been
seized by patrol craft of the coastal nation, forced to proceed to
port, charged with violating license and registration regulations,
and forced to pay fines before being released. In some instances
the vessels' fishing gear and catch have been confiscated as well."
There have been strafings and shootings in which American tuna
fishermen have been injured." Exacerbating the controversy is
the fact that naval vessels supplied under our military assistance
program frequently have been used in these seizures. 2 Moreover,
jet aircraft furnished the coastal nations by the United States
government have been used to locate the tuna boats .13 In two
5. BISHOP. INTERNATIONAL LAW 541 (2d ed. 1962).
In the Santiago Declaration the word sovereignty was used, indicating a territorial
sea was claimed. Subsequently, a statement was made to the effect that the claim was one
of an exclusive fishing zone rather than a territorial sea in the strict sense. However, on
July 27, 1969, all doubt was dispelled by the announcement that the area was indeed a
territorial sea. San Diego Union, July 27, 1969 at A-9, col. I (Home Ed.).
6. BISHOP, supra note 5, at 541.
7. Traditionally the United States has claimed a three mile belt of territorial sea.
See Jefferson's letter to the British Minister, Nov. 8, 1793, reprinted in BISHOP, supra
note 5, at 482.
8. Pub. L. No. 89-658 (Oct. 14, 1966).
9. This figure was arrived at by using the sum of 130 seizures for the period through
June 1967, as stated in Hearing on Foreign Seizures of U.S. Fishing Vessels Before the
Subconn. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 90-8, 19 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
1967 Hearings]. To this sum was added the subsequent seizures as recorded by the
American Tunaboat Association.
10. Id. at 58.
II. Interview with August Felando, General Manager, American Tunaboat
Association in San Diego, Calif., Apr. 1, 1969.
12. 1967 Hearings, supra note 9, at 42.
13. Id. at 64, 67.
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seizures, those of the Ronnie S. and the Determined, the
participating Ecuadorian crews had just completed a six month
training tour in the United States." Meanwhile, the United
States has given Peru and Ecuador over $457,009,000 in foreign
assistance. 5 Further, the loss suffered by the tuna industry and
the United States Treasury has been estimated at more than one
million dollars. 6
II. THE LATIN AMERICAN AND UNITED STATES POSITIONS VIS-A-
VIS INTERNATIONAL LAW
.4. Inteinational Law Regarding the Proper Breadth of the
Territorial Sea
The sources of international law are international
conventions, customary international law, general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations, judicial decisions and
writings of the publicists. 7 A study of these sources demonstrates
that they afford no definitive answer regarding the correct
breadth of the territorial sea. The crux of the problem is that the
present legal regime of the seas provides no solution for this
international fishing dispute. More specifically, there exists no
international convention governing disputes over the width of the
territorial sea, since the nations of the world failed to reach
accord on this issue at conferences at the Hague in 1930,18 and at
Geneva in 1958 and 1960.11 Customary international law fails to
provide an answer, since the three mile limit, adhered to for over
150 years by the major maritime powers, never achieved
anything approaching universal acceptance."' General principles
14. Id. at 42.
15. Id.
16. Rep. Bob Wilson (R. Calif.) described the losses this way: "Since 1955 our tuna
industry has paid $489,470 in fines to Latin American countries. This is in addition to
license and registration fees which have totaled $61,603 since 1961. These costs do not
include the economic losses incurred by our fishermen because their boats were detained
in Latin American ports. It has been estimated that the economic loss of the vessels
seized since 1961 totals $544,105. This is the value of the catch these boats would have
landed had they been able to fish the days they were under detention. In short, these
Latin American countries have extracted more than $1 million from our tuna industry
and the U.S. Treasury under the guise of sovereignty." Id. at 22.
17. Stat. of International Court of Justice (1945) art. 38, para. I.
18. Sorensen, The Law of the Sea, INT'L CONc. No. 520, 196 (1958).
19. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 539-47
(1962).
20. Traditionally, the Scandianavian countries claimed a four mile belt; certain
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of law recognized by civilized nations meet with the same
arguments as does customary international law, i.e.-the general
principles are diverse; there is no consensus as to the correct
width of the territorial sea. Judicial decisions do not provide an
answer because decisions of international tribunals are not
binding precedents. The doctrine of stare decisis has never been a
part of international law.2' Lastly, the publicists disagree, and
moreover, traditionally their opinions have been given little
weight.
22
B. The Latin A merican Position
The Latin American position regarding its right to the
biological riches of the seas contiguous to their coasts is based
on the premise that the geographical and biological
characteristics of the coast have created that richness. The seas
off Peru, for example, are teaming with fauna and flora. The
Peruvian rivers cut through highly mineralized zones in the
Andes from which they take "physiological minerals" whose
presence is of great value in the vital processes of marine
vegetation. Further, guano droppings, which have high fertilizing
power, add to the enrichment of waters adjacent to that state.
This constant shower of vital elements, operating for thousands
of years, has produced a "broth" that produces plankton as
food for the anchovies that in turn provide feed for the birds and
larger fish, thus closing a biological circle or "eco-system.
' 23
The icthyological wealth of the seas stands in contrast to the
impoverished sun-scorched soil of the coast, which makes
Mediterranean countries claimed six miles; and Czarist Russia claimed twelve miles.
Sorensen, supra note 18, at 242.
21. BIsHoP, supra note 5, at 37-38.
22. BIsHoP, supra note 5, at 35-36. As Justice Cockburn said:
For writers on international law, however valuable their labours may be
in elucidating and ascertaining the principles and rules of law, cannot make
the law. To be binding, the law must have received the assent of nations who
are to be bound by it. This assent may be expressed, as by treaty or the
acknowledged concurrence of governments, or may be implied from
established useage . . . . In the absence of proof of assent, as derived from
one or other of these sources, no unanimity on the part of the theoretical
writers would warrant the judicial application of the law on the sole authority
of their views or statements ....
Queen v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63, 202-04 (1876) as reprinted in BISHOP, supra note 5, at 36.
23. Cisneros, The 200 Mile Limit in the South Pacific: A New Position in
International Law with a Human and Juridical Content, A.B.A. SECT. OF INT'L & COMP.
LAW, 1964 PROC. 59.
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farming, except by expensive artificial irrigation, impossible. The
Peruvian is forced to live, whether he wants to or not, from
fishing, because he has no other means of subsistence. The
fertility of the seas, then, was offered by nature as compensation
for the desert provided by the climatological conditions on the
coast. Thus, in proclaiming a 200 mile territorial sea, the
Peruvian government has fulfilled its duty of protecting the
natural resources and prosperity of its peoples.2
The Latin Americans do not feel that they are attacking
international law, since in their opinion Grotius' theory of the
inexhaustibility of fish has been proven false.2 5 Moreover, it is
pointed out by the C.-E.-P. nations that prior to the Latin
American declaration, the United States had asserted its right to
establish "conservation zones" to protect fishing resources
otherwise within the high sea zones next to their coasts.2 The
Latin American countries feel they enjoy that same right.
C. The United States Position
The United States position regarding the fishing vessel
controversy is based on its historic opposition to the enlargement
of territorial waters. The United States decries extensive
territorial seas because an expansion of the territorial seas results
in a contraction of the high seas. When any nation increases the
width of her territorial seas, the rights of all nations to sail on,
fly over or otherwise use the high seas is correspondingly
curtailed.
27
If a wide territorial sea were claimed by all nations knotty
problems would develop in areas such as the Mediterranean, the
Caribbean, the Baltic, Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia. In
island areas enlargement of the territorial seas would result in
isolated "pockets" of high seas. Access to these pockets would be
controlled by the nations to whom the territorial seas
appertained.
2 8
Especially burdened would be the international straits. For
24. Id.
25. Id. at 58. But see M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 19, at 468.
26. Id. at 60.
27. Dean, The Geneva Conferenc?, on the Law of the Sea: What was A econtplished,




example, an extension of the territorial sea in the Straits of
Gibraltar to six miles would make the entire strait a territorial
sea, with no area of high seas remaining. While it is arguable
that all states afford commercial ships the right of "innocent
passage" through such straits from one part of the high seas to
another, the fact remains that the right of "innocent passage" is
a limited one, subject to the "laws and regulations enacted by
the coastal states" and subject, in special circumstances, to
suspension.
27
Were the high seas diminished, military vessels would
encounter tremendous difficulties. Warships have no right of
"innocent passage" through territorial seas. They must receive
permission in order to traverse the territorial waters of a coastal
state. Thus, the extension of the territorial seas would reduce the
effectiveness of naval operations. This is thought to be a major
reason why the Iron Curtain Countries, wary of the West's naval
supremacy, have persistently urged a wide territorial sea, or
alternatively, that each nation is competent to fix its own limit.*"'
One of the most important ramifications of a wide
territorial sea would be that air travel by all nations could be
curtailed. The airspace above territorial waters, like that over
land, is within the sovereign purview of the coastal nation.-
But, unlike commercial ships, commercial airlines enjoy no right
of "innocent passage." Therefore, an extension of the territorial
seas would necessitate revision of existing treaties allowing
overflight, the creation of new ones, or costly circuitous routes .
3 2
Additionally, in support of the United States position, it has
been argued that the maintenance of a three mile limit by the
United States and other nations which are responsible for 80
percent of the world's maritime traffic comes close to being
customary international law.*' Further, it is argued, the United
States proclamation establishing a conservation zone differs in
two significant respects from the Latin American declaration.
29. Franklin, The Law of the Sea: Some Recent Developments, 33 So. CALIF. L.
REV. 368 (1960).
30. Sorensen, supra note 18, at 201. The U.S.S.R. has been called the first rank power
in submarines. Dean, supra note 27, has pointed out how wide territorial seas could prove
very advantageous for submarine operations.
31. Franklin, supra note 29, at 368.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 366 n.41.
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First, the United States did not claim sovereignty over the high
seas which comprise the zones. Second, the United States
expressly recognized the rights of the nationals of other nations
to fish within the area pursuant to international agreements . 1
Moreover, it is argued, the doctrine of biological unity between
the continent and the adjacent sea is a "'highly doubtful hypothesis"
which is virtually unsupported by reliable scientific evidence. At
the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the Sea, held in Rome in 1955, the C.-E.-P.
nations' "eco-system" theory failed to win acceptance from the
experts as a proper basis for conservation or management
programs.?
III. RESPONSES TO INDUCE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
The Wet War rages on. The United States has tried for 17
years to resolve the conflict. This country made continual efforts
to negotiate the matter. These requests for negotiations were met
by refusal on the part of Chile, Ecuador and Peru, who made it
clear that their juridical position was not open to question or
debate." Further, United States proposals to submit the matter
to the International Court of Justice or to an arbitral tribunal
were ignored.*- Until recently, the United States response was
limited to attempts at negotiation in order not to jeopardize long
range policy goals in Latin America- particularly, the Alliance
for Progress, which has been called the cornerstone of United
States foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere." However, in
34. See BISHOP, supra note 5, at 539.
35. D. JOHNSTON. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 336-37 (1965).
36. 1967 Hearings, supra note 9, at 59.
37. Id.
38. Weissberg, supra note 2, at 714. One sector of the United States populace would
like to see the policy of "toleration" which has existed for 17 years continued. They
reason that the economic loss to one interest-group, i.e,, the tuna fishermen, is little when
balanced against the interests which might be jeopardized if a major rift developed
between the C.-E.-P. nations and the United States, as a result of a harsher response to
the fishing vessel controversy.
Another sector of the United States populace argues that it is not the fishermen
alone who are involved. Each seizure of a fishing vessel and fine results in money flowing
from the taxpayers' pocket to reimburse the fishermen under the terms of the Fishermen's
Protective Act. Further, if the situation is allowed to continue unabated, a trend may
develop in which more nations may make similar extensive claims, thereby amplifying the
problems involved herein. Moreover, it is clear that the ever-present anti-yangoistno may
be triggered regardless of any actions on the part of the United States. In fact, the most
recent anti-American episode occurred when the new military junta in Peru used the
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May, 1969, the United States invoked the Foreign Military Sales
Act,:1s which forbids the sale of military goods or services to any
nation seizing United States fishing vessels in international
waters4 Shortly thereafter, Chile, Ecuador and Peru, for the
first time, consented to come to the conference table." Whether
the proposed conference will resolve the conflict remains to be
seen.
International law, as mentioned earlier, provides no answer
to the fishing vessel imbroglio. There are merits to each side.
What follows indicates that the United States has a variety of
means available to it with which to induce a negotiated
settlement. Some of these responses represent old tools-long
used in the international arena for persuading nations to
negotiate; others are new-especially created by Congress to deal
with the fishing vessel seizures. These responses include politicl,
military, economic and judicial alternatives.
A. Political Responses
I. Regional .Agreements
Regional agreements have been suggested by some writers as
the ideal solution to fishing disputes. 2 However, the history of
repudiation and non-membership surrounding an existing
regional agreement does not augur well for the use of this
alternative. The existing agreement is the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission, created in May 1949. This open-
ended treaty is aimed at maintaining populations of yellowfin and
skipjack tuna and other kinds of fish taken by fishing vessels in
the eastern Pacific Ocean.:1  Ecuador, originally a member,
recently withdrew in order to protect her 200 mile claim. Peru
had never joined, probably for the same reason."
expropriation without compensation of Standard Oil of New Jersey's 200 million dollar
assets as a mechanism for the unification of the Peruvian society and consequent
consolidation of its power. See Report from Linta, Fortune 55, Mar. 1969. Apparently
the Nixon Administration believes that the 17 year period of "toleration" or
permissiveness should come to an end, since it is the first Administration to take a firmer
stand on the fishing vessel seizure conflict.
39. Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320.
40. San Diego Union, May 19, 1969, at I, col. I (Home ed.).
41. See San Diego Union, July 27, 1969, at A-9, col. I (Home ed.).
42. JOHNSTON, supra note 35,' at 458.
43. Interamerican Tropical Tuna Commission Treaty, May 31, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 231,
T.I.A.S. No. 2044.
44. Interview with August Felando, supra note II.
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In favor of this alternative it can be said that a regional
agreement would represent a non-violent solution to the conflict,
produced by those fishing nations directly involved (as opposed
to resolution by a larger body such as the United Nations or the
Organization of American States which have non-seafaring
members). Moreover, recently created regional agreements
promise to be effective in other parts of the world.", If a newly-
devised regional agreement could escape the malaise which has
afflicted the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Treaty,
it may well prove to be the most satisfactory solution to the
fishing vessel controversy.
2. Convene a Third United Nations (onference on the Law
oj the Sea ivith the Objective of Settling the Territorial Sea Issue
Another possibility would be for the United States to work
toward convening a third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, in order to settle the territorial sea issue. However the
community of nations has failed to reach agreement on the
breadth of the territorial waters at the Hague in 1930 and at
Gertva in 1958 and 196011 Moreover, assuming that a third
Ur-ited Nations Conference were convened and agreement
re:.-htd on the width of the territorial sea, such a rule would be
binding only on those nations which consented to be bound."
Assuming further that a nation signs and ratifies a treaty, it
cannot be forced to comply with its provisions, there is no
international machinery to compel performance. Finally, this is a
very time-consuming alternative- perhaps an interim response
would be necessitated.
In favor of this alternative the following arguments could be
made. First, there is ground for optimism that, if careful
groundwork were done beforehand, accord on the size of the
territorial sea could be reached, since the Canadian-United
States compromise proposal, introduced at the last conference,
failed by only one vote.6 If just one state voting against it had
45. See Jessup, The Law of the Sea Around Us, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 104 (1961);
McKernan, Fisheries and Oceanography, OCEAN SCIENCES 215 (E. Long ed. 1964).
46. See notes 18 and 19 supra.
47. W. GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (1957).
48. The United States-Canadian compromise proposal was a six-mile territorial sea
coupled with a further six-mile zone over which the coastal state would have exclusive
fishing rights subject to certain prior rights of other states. BIsHoP. supra note 5, at 490.
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abstained, the 54 vote total necessary for adoption would have
been reached."' Second, as to the refusal of a given nation to sign
the convention, it could be argued that a rule approved by the
major world powers can be expected to "become part of the
universally received law of nations within a moderate time."',
Third, even though there is no machinery with which to compel a
signatory's performance, it is universally recognized that one of
the most fundamental rules of international law is that treaties
must be performed in good faith; the rule of pacta sunt servanda."5
Fourth, although it is a time-consuming alternative, it is not
mutually exclusive vis-a-vis other responses. It could be
combined quite readily with a response aimed at swift
termination of the seizures. Lastly, this alternative has the
advantage of being a fair, peaceful and permanent solution to the
fishing vessel dispute, since it strikes at the very heart of the
problem.
A variation of this alternative would be to convene a Law of
the Sea Conference to consider the fisheries issue as separate and
distinct from that of the territorial sea matter. A resolution to
that effect was adopted by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association. It was thought that, since the
territorial sea question is frought with security and economic
considerations, the nations could reach,agreement more readily if
the two issues were sundered"
5 2
3. /est SovereigntY over the Living Resources of the Sect in the
United .Vations
Much has been written with regard to vesting sovereignty
over the bed of the sea in the United Nations or some similar
international agency;- :' less has been written in this area regarding
the living resources of the seas. Recently, however, two such
plans were presented. One was a fairly concrete scheme presented
by Ambassador Arvid Pardo, Malta's Permanent Representative
49. Id.
50. Pollack, The Sources of International Law, 2 COL. L. REV. 511-12 (1902).
51. BISHOP, supra note 5, at 134.
52. JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 252 n.346.
53. See generally Bernfield, Developing the Resources oJ the Sea Securitr ol
Investinent, INT'L LAWYER 73-74 (1967); Grunawalt, supra note 3, at 132; Rich &
Englehardt, A Proposal Front a U.S. and a Soviet Scientist: Ocean Resources and
Developing Nations, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS No. 2, 1 (1968); Young, Limits
oJ the Continental Shelf and Beyond, PROC. Am. Soc. INT'L L. 234 (1968).
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to the United Nations. This plan, unlike the original proposal
made by Malta before the General Assembly, envisioned
international control of the living resources of the oceans.
Importantly, this plan favored vesting authority in an agency
separate from the United Nations itself, but perhaps, having a
loose tie such as that which links the World Bank to the United
Nations.
5 1
The other plan covering both organic and inorganic
resources of the seas was sponsored by 'United States Senator
Claiborne Pell. His proposal called for a Treaty of Ocean Space.
Senator Pell cited the international treaties relating to Ant-
arctica and outer space as precedents for establishing similar
agreements with respect to the oceans '55 This alternative has the
obvious advantage of enabling all of mankind to benefit from the
ocean's resources. Its disadvantage is that it may be premature.
The paucity of scientific knowledge concerning the ocean's
wealth and the means of exploiting it make it an unattractive
alternative to the United States at the present time.-
4. Fish Elsewhere
Tuna, like most fish, are most commonly found in
commercial quantities in the relatively shallow waters above the
continental shelf, adjacent to the great continental land masses.
It is in these waters that the light, temperature, nutrient elements
and other factors combine to produce the most favorable
ecological conditions. Thus, the intense concentrations of fish
exist in some proximity to particular coastal states. 7 For this
reason, when the San Diego-based tuna fleet pursues the catch
into waters off the coast of Latin America, they do so not of
choice but of commercial necessity. Moreover, by fishing on the
challenged waters, the fishermen are upholding the rights of the
United States which might otherwise be atrophied or lost 8
54. Address by Arvid Pardo, Malta's permanent Ambassador to the U.N., Panel,
Whose is the Bed of the Sea, PROc. A,%i. Soc. INT'L L. (1968).
55. BusINESS WEEK, Nov. II, 1967 at 68.
56. Hull, The Political Ocean, 45 FOREIGN AHAIRS 500 (1967). Contra.
Eichelberger, The United Nations and the Bed of the Sea, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 339 (1969).
57. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 19, at 458.
58. As was reiterated at the House Hearings of June 1967, in support of the
proposed legislation to aid the fishermen:
It will be the right of the United States, under international law and not that
of the individual fisherman, which is being tested. The only means the United
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B. Military Response-Send a Military Escort to Protect Tuna
Vessels
It has been suggested by several legislators that the United
States should respond to the seizure of United States fishing
vessels by assigning a military escort to protect the fishing
fleets." This has proven efficacious in halting other fishing -vessel
seizures. Recently a Coast Guard patrol was used to protect
United States' shrimp boats operating in the Gulf of Mexico.
This was an effective deterrent to seizures by Mexico, as well as
an inducement to negotiate. The "Shrimp Patrol" was
terminated in January 1969 upon agreement by Mexico and the
United States concerning fishing rights in that areaY' Further,
before United States involvement in World War II, and after our
formal entry into the war, Navy "guard crews" were assigned to
the merchant vessels to discourage surface attacks by enemy
submarines." Also, Presidents Monroe, '62 Jackson,"3 Van Buren"
and Fillmore 5 dispatched military escorts for the protection of
United States fishing and merchant vessels. This response has
been employed by other nations as well. France stopped the
seizure of her ships off the coast of South America by sending a
destroyer to protect her fishing fleet.",
Thus, in favor of this response, it must be said that it has
proven to be an effective method of ending seizures of fishing
States has, in practice, to maintain these rights is to continue their exercise
by its fishermen. Unless the owners of the vessel can be assured of the
protection of their government and the acceptance by their government of a
share of the economic risk of exercising such rights, they cannot continue to
take the risk of sending their vessels into such waters. Unless, on the other
hand, they do continue to fish in the challenged waters, these rights of the
United States will stand in danger of being atrophied and lost.
1967 Hearings, supra note 9, at 44.
59. San Diego Independent, Feb. 27, 1969 at 1, col. 1. Rep. Lionel Van Deerlin (D-
Calif.) proposed that Marines "ride shotgun" on American fishing vessels operating off
Latin America.
60. 1967 Hearings, supra note 9, at 82; Interview with August Felando, supra note
II.
61. San Diego Independent, Feb. 27, 1969 at p. 1, col. I.
62. J. Monroe, 7th Annual Message, Dec. 2, 1823, 2 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND
PAPERS 01- THE PRESIDENTS 1789-189 213 (1896).
63. A. Jackson, 3rd Annual Message, Dec. 6, 1831, Id. at 552.
64. M. Van Buren, 4th Annual Message, Dec. 5, 1840, 3 Id. at 618.
65. M. Fillmore, Special Message to the House of Representatives, Aug. 9, 1852, 5
Id. at 158.
66. San Diego Union, Sept. 8, 1967 at 7, col. 7 (Home ed.).
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vessels. Further, this action has the attribute of being closely
related to the conflict, whereas it is arguable that some possible
sanctions, such as cutting off foreign aid, are not. On the other
hand, this alternative has the serious drawback of being
potentially violent. Resort to armed force is prohibited by the
United Nations Charter. It is arguable that even though Peru
and Ecuador have backed their position with force, it behooves
the United States to choose a different response. Also, it is
possible that the assignment of a military escort for our tuna
fleet would serve to escalate the Wet War rather than ending it.
C. Economic Responses
1. Cut Off Foreign Aid
Despite the seizure of 140 fishing vessels during the past 17
years, the United States has continued to make enormous
expenditures in these republics. In the period from 1961 to 1966,
for example, the foreign assistance given to Peru and Ecuador
totaled $457,009,000
s."
The cessation of foreign assistance to nations as a method
of sanction has strong supporters and detractors. In opposition
to the suspension of foreign aid, it has been argued that it could
result in an upsurge of anti-American sentiment; the heretofore
diverse public opinion could become unified against the United
States; the Communists could take advantage of the situation to
reiterate their cries of Yankee economic imperialism. This, it is
argued, would frustrate the United States' long range foreign
policy objectives. Further it has been argued that a response so
unconnected with the fishing dispute should not be utilized."
Those supporting the termination of foreign assistance to
recalcitrant nations point out that when the United States cut off
foreign aid to Ceylon in the 1960's in the only enforcement of
the Hickenlooper Amendment" to date, the anti-American
67. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
68. 1967 Hearings, supra note 9, at 42.
69. Weissberg, supra note 2, at 714.
70. 76 Stat. 260-61 (1962), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1964). Tie
Hickenlooper Amendment, as this subsection has come to be called, provides that the
President shall suspend aid to any country which expropriates American-owned assets
without paying "'speedy compensation for such property in convertible foreign exchange,
equivalent to the full value thereof." The Hickenlooper Amendment has not been applied
to the seizure of fishing vessels because this activity is considered "harassment" rather
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reaction was ephemeral; the United States' long range goals were
not thwarted.7' Further, it is argued, this sanction has proven
effective. The World Bank has used this measure with
spectacular success. That organization will not make loans to
nations that refuse to honor their contractual obligations with
private investors, or that refuse to compensate foreign
entrepreneurs for property which has been expropriated. This
policy is known to the would-be borrowers. Thus, they are on
notice that if they engage in conduct which is proscribed by the
World Bank, they will be ineligible for assistance. -72 The record of
the World Bank since its inception shows not one default.7 On
the other hand, the World Bank has primarily economic rather
than political consequences to consider.
A variation of the alternative of cutting off all foreign aid to
a given nation, would be the deduction of foreign assistance in an
amount equal to the fines imposed upon the fishing vessels. This
alternative has the approval of Congress as is evidenced by the
enactment of the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967'7 which
amends the 1954 act of the same name .7  The deduction of
foreign assistance commensurate with the fine has an elemental
than expropriation. Interview with Rep. Bob Wilson (R-Calif.) in San Diego, March I1,
1969.
71. Olmstead, Foreign Aid as an Effective Means of Persuasion, 1964 A-,I. Soc:
INT'L L. 206.
72. Id. at 208.
73. W. FREIDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 92
(1964).
74. 22 U.S.C. 1971-77 (Supp. 1969). The significant section of the Fishermen's
Protective Act of 1967 is the following:
Sec. 5. The Secretary of State shall take such action as he may deem
appropriate to make and collect claims against a foreign country for amounts
expended by the United States under the provisions of this Act (including
payments made pursuant to section 7) because of the seizure of a vessel of the
United States by such country. If such country fails or refuses to make
payment in full within one hundred and twenty days after receiving notice of
any such claim of the United States, the Secretary of State shall withhold,
pending such payment an amount equal to such unpaid claim from any funds
programmed for the current fiscal year for assistance to the government of
such country (as shown in materials concerning such fiscal year presented to
the Congress in connection with its consideration of amendments to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961). Amounts withheld under this section shall
not constitute satisfaction of any such claim of the United States against
such foreign country.
75. 22 U.S.C. 1971-76 (1964). The 1954 Fishermen's Protective Act provided for
reimbursement to fishermen of fines paid to foreign countries as a result of unlawful
seizures.
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justice about it. However, this statute has not been utilized as of
this writing.
2. Terminate Loans of Ships
Under existing agreements the Latin American countries
involved in the tuna boat conflict have been loaned the following
United States vessels: Chile has seven vessels (including two
destroyers); Ecuador has seven; Peru has nine vessels (including
two destroyers).76 Some of these ships have been used in the
seizure of American tuna boats.7
The Naval Vessel Loan-Extension Actfh provides for the
termination by the United States of naval vessel loan agreements
upon a seizure of any United States fishing vessel because of' its
activities in international waters. The State Department has
considered and then rejected the alternative of terminating naval
vessel loans. The precise reasons for rejection of this response
comprise classified information .7 However, one might speculate
as to the factors motivating the State Department's decision.
First, there exists the possibility that termination of loan
agreements on military ships would incense the Latin Americans.
and thereby imperil our broad foreign policy objectives in Latin
America. This prospect, however, should not deter use of this
alternative, since any sanction the United States might impose
carries this danger. Second, by recalling our naval vessels we
would be endangering the security of the Latin American
nations, and, indirectly, our own. However, we have naval vessel
loan agreements with other Latin American nations."' These
latter vessels would be available for protection of the Western
Hemisphere in event of a crisis. This factor diminishes the
security risk involved in terminating the loans to the recalcitrant
nations.
The response of recalling our naval vessels has been
approved by Congress after consideration of all the ramifications
of such an act."1 Subsequently, Congress went further, and in 1968,
76. 1967 Hearings, supra note 9, at 65.
77. Id. at 42.
78. Pub. L. No. 90-224, 81 Stat. 729 (1967).
79. 1967 Hearings, supra note 9, at 72.
80. Id. at 65-67.
81. See note 77 supra.
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passed the Foreign Military Sales Act,s2 which called for more
drastic reduction of military assistance than was envisioned in
the Naval Vessel Loan-Extension Act. Furthermore, this
response also has the desirable characteristic of being closely
related to the conflict since, in some instances, the very ships
loaned to the Latin American nations :' seized the tuna clippers.
This alternative appears to be a relatively mild sanction. Its non-
violent nature makes it doubly attractive.
3. I-cononic Boycoti
Another possible response to the fishing vessel dispute is the
use of economic reprisals against South American exports. This
response has the attribute of being a pacific manner of settling
the international controversy as is advocated by the United
Nations Charter." However, this approach could have serious
ramifications in this half of the Western Hemisphere as well as
the other. In Ecuador, for example, a United States corporation,
the United Fruit Company, accounts for 19 percent of Ecuador's
total banana exports." Ownership of the United Fruit Company
is widely dispersed." It has almost as many United States
stockholders as it has tropical employees.87 Therefore, many
United States investors would be affected by a United States
refusal to buy Ecuadorian bananas. Also, North American
importers, jobbers and retailers would be adversely affected.
Undoubtedly the use of this alternative would penalize Ecuador
(financially as well as labor wise) since bananas constitute over
50 percent of her total exportsxs
Most importantly, an economic boycott would tend to
discourage private United States investment in Latin America.
One of this country's broad foreign policy objectives is the
encouragement of such private investment:.9 An immense flow of
capital is needed to raise the standard of living in Latin America,
and investment by both governmental and private sectors is
82. Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 (1968).
83. 1967 Hearings. supra note 9, at 65.
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
85. S. MAY & G. PLAZA, THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY IN LATIN AMERICA 175
(1958).
86. td. at 115.
87. Id. at 117.
88. Id. at 53.
89. Olmstead, supra note 71, at 206-07.
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deemed necessary."' Therefore, any response which would directly
impair the flow of capital to Latin America by private United
States investors should be weighed with regard to the foreign
policy objectives.
D. Judicial Responses
1. Bring Suit in the International Court of Justice
Perhaps "the ideal solution to the fishing vessel dispute would
be to bring suit in the International Court of Justice, the judicial
organization of the United Nations. However, no would-be
plaintiff can compel another state to have their differences
adjudicated in the l.C.J. The Court has no jurisdiction unless both
parties agree to submit the matter to it.91
Attempts have been made to confer upon the I.C.J.
automatic jurisdiction over international disputes. One such
attempt was the formulation of the "optional clause" for
compulsory jurisdiction of the court." Thereunder, states may
give in advance their consent to being sued by declaring:
that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the
same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court. in all legal
disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treat%: (b) any
question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact
which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the
reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation .9
The United States' acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
under the "optional clause" carried an important qualification.
The United States agreed to compulsory jurisdiction except
"'with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by
the United States of America.""'4 The words "as determined by
the United States of America" were rejected by the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, but were added on the floor of
90. Id. at 206.
91. BISHOP, supra note 5, at 63.
92. International Court of Justice Stat., art. 36, para. 2.
93. Id.
94. 61 Stat. 1218; 15 Dept. of State Bull. 452 (1946).
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the Senate." This qualification is known as the Connally
Amendment. Efforts have been made to eliminate this "self-
judging" reservation of America's acceptance of the Court's
mandatory jurisdiction. Significantly, when states do submit
disputes for legal adjudication, they normally carry out the
judgmentY
Thus, resort could be had to this procedure for resolving the
fishing vessel controversy only if the offending nations deigned
to litigate the matter, and, if the I.C.J. was not forced to dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction due to the Connally
AmendmentY7 The United States has offered to submit the
matter to the I.C.J. and Chile, Ecuador and Peru have ignored
the proffer s It is, therefore, quite unlikely that they would
consent to being party-defendants unless other measures were
taken to persuade them to do so.
2. Submit the Matter to an Arbitral Tribunal
Another possibility would be to submit the dispute to an
arbitral tribunal. International arbitration involves the settlement
of conflict among states by applying rules of law to the facts
foundY" Arbitration is a judicial process, distinguished from
adjudication before a permanent international court by the ad
hoc character of the tribunal and the extent of the tribunal's
control.""'
This alternative is attractive since it would provide for a
hearing of the dispute by a relatively impartial forum. Also, it
would constitute a peaceful and, hopefully, a just solution to the
fishing vessel controversy. However, it meets with the same
objection as the suggestion of bringing suit in the International
Court of Justice, i.e., there is no way to force another country to
arbitrate. Chile, Peru and Ecuador have not only not answered
the United States' offers to arbitrate,"" bat have explicitly stated
95. BISHOP, supra note 5, at 64.
96. Id.
97. Dismissal occurred when France, who like the United States, qualifiedly accepted
compulsory jurisdiction' of the I.C.J., tried to sue Norway (whose acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction was complete and unqualified). BISHOP, supra note 5, at 65.
98. 1967 Hearings, supra note 9, at 23, 59, 68.
99. BISHOP, supra note 5, at 60.
100. Id.
101. 1967 Hearings, supra note 9, at 23, 59, 68.
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that their juridical position is not open to question or
argument."'-'
IV. CONCLUSION
The tuna boat conflict arises from the variant territorial sea
claims made by Chile-Ecuador-Peru and the United States. The
present law of the seas is inadequate to resolve such claims on a
right-wrong basis. Arguments are persuasive for both sides of the
issue; but conviction depends upon the point or view. The
developing C.-E.-P. nations appear intent upon protecting their
sovereignty and immediate national needs. The more powerful
United States, while protecting a limited immediate interest,
seeks solutions which will not jeopardize its broader international
goals and involvements.
Some resolution must be reached. The United States has a
wide variety of tools available for persuading the other side to
negotiate a settlement. The first firm American
response- terminating military sales to Ecuador and Peru-has
apparently induced the C.-E.-P. nations to come to a conference
table after many years of refusal. However, hope that a
compromise solution would be reached was diminished by the
Peruvian declaration on the eve of the conference. Peru
announced that her 200 mile claim was to a territorial sea,
thereby clarifying and buttressing her juridical position. If,
despite this latest evidence of an uncompromising stand on the
part of the Latin American contingent, the conference does
produce a workable regional solution to the fishing dispute, there
will eventually have to be agreement, preferably multi-national,
on the territorial sea issue to preclude other Wet Wars.
JANE SHUTTLEWORTH WIEGAND
102. Id. at 59.
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